



LOST IN TRANSMISSION

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European Cyber Security Challenge 2018
London, United Kingdom

1. Initial Write-Up

One of our corporate backup servers has been possibly compromised. Our Data Loss Prevention (DLP) system has discovered some suspicious traffic late last night between this machine and what seems to be a Command and Control (C&C) server.

Fortunately, we have a cron task that encrypts all our backups every couple of minutes. Still, there is a slight chance some data was exfiltrated.

Our Security department needs your high level expertise to check if any critical data has been compromised by understanding the communication protocol between the compromised machine and the C&C.

2. Artifacts

- The relevant traffic has been anonymised (cnc.pcap).
- The relevant C&C server traffic has been isolated (10.21.0.17) and our backup server has the IPv4 10.21.0.3. On that particular day, the critical files being uploaded on the backup server had the following MD5 hashes (critical.txt)

3. Challenge specifications

- Category: Traffic Analysis

4. Artifacts hashing

FILES	MD5	SHA256
cnc.pcap	06b48efe9d6c3b4a8ba1b ec0ee2d744a	50e7fdc477420499b2a29bcf40ef641c117ce9bc8a60423 8718ee0241e98440c

Critical.txt	95b9d41174d4f17fa14c9 2a3e9de9ffd	fad8235c624d729520e61400ac3a74494da5190546f543 e15bbb3a8022a3f8ab
Solution.py	baa875e949e8da7e069df 838d1c4a837	ad10674cfe04f8119f0dbe40e2b1d4f937c6b319fd780d5 43fe53b07c8822b11

5. Tools needed

Description:

Tools needed for the solution of the challenge:

- General Linux tools
- PCAP analysis tools(Wireshark)

6. Walkthrough (writeup)

1. Open the pcap in Wireshark
2. Apply the filter: ip.src == 10.21.0.17 or ip.src == 10.21.0.3

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
43	15.086926	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	76	60886 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK
44	15.086936	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	76	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 60886 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200
47	15.086968	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=J
48	15.086969	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	[TCP Dup ACK 47#1] 60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=
49	15.087075	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	HTTP	177	GET / HTTP/1.1
50	15.087078	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	177	[TCP Retransmission] 60886 → 80 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=
57	15.087237	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=110 Ack=235 Win=30336 Len=0 TSv
58	15.087239	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	[TCP Dup ACK 57#1] 60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=110 Ack=235
59	15.087246	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=110 Ack=848 Win=31616 Len=0 TSv
60	15.087248	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	[TCP Dup ACK 59#1] 60886 → 80 [ACK] Seq=110 Ack=848
61	15.087481	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	60886 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=110 Ack=848 Win=31616 Len=
62	15.087484	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.2	TCP	68	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 60886 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=110 Ack=
71	16.089376	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	TCP	76	51876 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK
72	16.089385	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	TCP	76	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 51876 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200
73	16.089402	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	TCP	76	80 → 51876 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=28960 Len=0 MS
74	16.089404	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	TCP	76	[TCP Out-Of-Order] 80 → 51876 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
75	16.089415	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	TCP	68	51876 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=2

> Frame 73: 76 bytes on wire (608 bits), 76 bytes captured (608 bits)
 > Linux cooked capture
 > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.21.0.17, Dst: 10.21.0.3
 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 80, Dst Port: 51876, Seq: 0, Ack: 1, Len: 0

```

0000  00 03 00 01 00 06 02 42 0a 15 00 11 00 00 08 00  ....B .....
0010  45 00 00 3c 00 00 40 00 40 06 26 7f 0a 15 00 11   E...@. @.&....
0020  .....
```

We observe some HTTP traffic. Let's isolate it.


3. Apply the filter: (ip.src == 10.21.0.17 or ip.src == 10.21.0.3) and http

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
319	28.143380	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
337	31.173531	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	8127	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
367	31.174067	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
379	32.185540	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	126	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
409	32.187681	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
427	37.209031	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	7611	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
457	37.211998	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
475	40.225660	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	4371	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
507	40.228374	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
527	41.250740	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	186	HTTP/1.0 200 OK (text/html)
539	41.250826	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	10811	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
561	47.289311	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	2851	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
593	47.292109	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation
613	47.304831	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	186	HTTP/1.0 200 OK (text/html)
625	47.304898	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	1661	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
647	48.342591	10.21.0.3	10.21.0.17	HTTP	3469	POST /form.php HTTP/1.1 (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
679	48.344999	10.21.0.17	10.21.0.3	HTTP	68	Continuation

> Frame 49: 177 bytes on wire (1416 bits), 177 bytes captured (1416 bits)
 > Linux cooked capture
 > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.21.0.3, Dst: 10.21.0.2
 > Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 60886, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 109
 > Hypertext Transfer Protocol

We observe the following protocol:

- GET register.php > likely generates Unique ID (reply sent back in base64): dWlkOiBFM1pJRzZBTDNaVDgzQ1JaTE83NjdYSTIDNFFKNkUQUFHOFk=
 - GET up.php > likely gets the uploading server
 - GET cmd.php > gets a command list_files
 - POST from.php > base64 information using the uid
4. Extract all HTTP objects using Wireshark



5. We remove all files that are irrelevant (replies from C&C server – “OK!”)

```
find . -name "*" -size -4 -delete
```

6. We write a python script to parse all the files, decode the URL string from base64. (solution.py)
 7. We see the recovered data are archive files

```
recover50.tar: gzip compressed data, last modified:
Mon May 28 16:22:34 2018, from Unix
```

8. We decompress the files

```
for file in $(ls -1); do tar -xvf $file; done
```

9. We identify the compromised file:

90a1a87ceccef2abc24dbf56ba2906546E7R6YV8SOHC0W.acc